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Abstract—The success of blockchain as the underlying tech-
nology for cryptocurrencies has opened up possibilities for its
use in other application domains as well. The main advantages
of blockchain for its potential use in other domains are its
inherent security mechanisms and immunity to different attacks.
A blockchain relies on a consensus method for agreeing on any
new data. Most of the consensus methods which are currently
used for the blockchain of different cryptocurrencies require
high computational power and thus are not apt for resource-
constrained systems.
In this article, we discuss and survey the various blockchain
based consensus methods that are applicable to resource con-
strained IoT devices and networks. A typical IoT network
consists of several devices which have limited computational and
communications capabilities. Most often, these devices cannot
perform intensive computations and are starved for bandwidth.
Therefore, we discuss the possible measures that can be taken
to reduce the computational power and convergence time for
the underlying consensus methods. We also talk about some of
the alternatives to the public blockchain like private blockchain
and tangle, along with their potential adoption for IoT networks.
Furthermore, we review the existing consensus methods that have
been implemented and explore the possibility of utilizing them
to realize a blockchain based IoT network. Some of the open
research challenges are also put forward.
Keywords-IoT networks; Blockchain; Consensus; Hyperledger;
Tangle.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing the proliferation of Internet of Thing
(IoT) applications in our houses, offices, neighborhoods and
cities. Adoption of IoT based technologies are poised to make
a big impact on various sectors of our daily lives, including
energy, manufacturing, intelligent transportation and smart
cities. With more and more autonomous deployments of po-
tentially large scale IoT systems, ensuring security, availability
and confidentiality of the data, the devices and the networks
become utmost critical [1].
In order to realize an entirely autonomous IoT network, dif-
ferent sensors and devices (generically referred to as ‘nodes’)
in an IoT network need to communicate with each other in
a distributed fashion. This requires a mechanism by which
different nodes in an IoT network can agree upon the validity
of any communicated data. One of the best ways to achieve
this is to use a consensus method. There exist different con-
sensus methods by which different nodes can reach a common
decision without the participation of a central controller [2].
Consensus methods typically require high computational and
communications capabilities. There are some that are less
demanding, however, they do not provide strict guarantees on
the performance attributes [3].
As far as the computational and communication capabilities
of the IoT devices are concerned, they are typically inexpen-
sive low-powered embedded computing platforms capable of
performing their bare minimum tasks. Most embedded IoT
devices are equipped with 8-bit or 16-bit microcontrollers
with very little RAM and storage capacities, and can connect
to the Internet either via ethernet or low-powered wireless
communications such as IEEE 802.15.4 [4]. These resource
constraints make it difficult to directly apply the traditional
consensus protocols to IoT networks. Newer technologies like
blockchain [3] and tangle [5], that use consensus methods
for accepting new data, have the potential to be customized
depending on the requirements and constraints of various IoT
devices and networks.
This article reviews how blockchain works and argues
that full-fledged implementations of blockchain (as in bit-
coin and other cryptocurrencies) are impractical for resource-
constrained IoT devices and networks. Though blockchain
employs very compute-intensive hash operations for cryp-
tocurrencies, such operations are not essential for non-critical
systems as resource constrained systems might be willing to
trade some level of data integrity for savings in computations
and energy consumption. Private blockchains, that allow par-
ticipation of valid users and are not open to the public, have
been proposed to overcome this problem. These blockchain
implementations use consensus methods that do not require
high computational power for solving hash problems. How-
ever, since they are private, only valid users can access them.
We compare the pros and cons of various implementations and
discuss their applicability towards IoT networks. We highlight
some of the research challenges that need to be addressed for
widespread deployment of blockchain based IoT networks.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section II,
we briefly discuss what blockchain is. In section III, we discuss
what the requirements of IoT networks and also what the
limitations of the current technologies are. In section IV, we
motivate how blockchain can be applied for IoT networks with
appropriate modifications. In section V, we discuss different
consensus methods. In section VI, we survey the existing
implementations of blockchain and discuss their pros and cons.
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2In section VII, we put forward some of the open research
challenges. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN
A blockchain is a distributed and tamper-resistant database
that no single entity controls, but can be shared and accessed
by all. New records (called blocks) can be added to the existing
blocks as long as the new block is approved by all in the
network. Also, once blocks are recorded, it is not feasible to
modify or erase them. Blockchains have been designed to work
on an unreliable network with adversarial entities. By using
sophisticated and compute-intensive secure hash algorithms,
blockchain achieves data integrity which prevents data erasure
or manipulation and invalid information from being recorded.
These compute-intensive algorithms are part of a proof of
work which is a method of consensus by which different
nodes in a network can agree upon new data or detect an
anomaly. However, there exist other consensus methods with
significantly lower computational requirement and network
overhead that we will review in section V.
Proof of work is a computationally expensive consensus
approach. In this method, different nodes in a blockchain try
to solve a cryptographic hash function, SHA-256 in particular.
SHA-256 generates a unique, fixed size 256-bit hash. The
process of finding the next block through solving this hash
problem is called mining and the users performing this task
are called miners. The solved block contains transactions,
hash of the previous block, nonce and a time stamp. After
a miner finds a valid nonce value which solves this problem,
he releases his solved block so other miners can be aware
of it. In the next step, other miners verify the claimed block
by using the block information and its claimed associated
nonce as an input to a SHA-256 function. If its output is
less than the target value, the miner will accept it as a valid
block and withdraw all of his effort for solving that block and
move on to find the next block [6]. The miners’ incentive for
verifying a block is to avoid spending time and computational
resources on an already solved block. On the other hand, it is
vital for miners to be the one who finds the next block while
validating a new block. What withholds miners from accepting
a new block without validating it and mining the next block is
that whenever the blockchain detects an invalid block, it will
discard that block and all the blocks built upon it. A block gets
more credibility when more blocks are built upon it. This is
known as confirmation in cryptocurrencies’ blockchains. After
several confirmations, a block and its contained transactions
are considered to be acceptable.
Blockchain stores all data transactions in chained blocks,
i.e., a block contains several transactions linked to previous
blocks by a hash pointer [7]. This chain continues to the
first block mined in blockchain which in bitcoin blockchain
was mined by Satoshi Nakamoto and is called the Genesis
block. This architecture makes it infeasible to modify the
transactions in the blockchain because in order to change a
transaction, it is required to change all the blocks built on
that transaction in less than 10 minutes. This modification
might be feasible with more than half of the hash rate power
of the world. In other words, in order to add a block to the
blockchain, the miner should find a specific nonce value for
each block in a way that the hash value of that block be less
than a specific target value. This process is mathematically
hard and time consuming because it can only be done by brute
force search and the miners have to try different nonce values
randomly to reach the target value [6]. However, adversaries
can affect blockchain operation of cryptocurrencies such as
bitcoin by gaining control over 25% of computation power
via an attack known as selfish mining [8]. Although this attack
cannot jeopardize the immutability of bitcoin’s blockchain, it
can increase revenue of adversaries.
A. An Illustrative Example
Figure 1 illustrates a blockchain of 4 blocks each of
which contains the Block number, a (random number)
Nonce, the data, the hash of the previous block (i.e.,
Prev) and the hash of the current block (i.e., Hash).
Since there is no block prior to block 1, the previous
hash is set to all 0’s. With the block number, data and
previous hash known, the objective is to find the nonce
such that the hash of all is less than a target value, i.e.,
SHA-256 (Block#, Nonce, Data, Prev) ≤ target value.
Suppose the nonce found is 42345 as shown in block 1. The
target value indicates the difficulty level of the proof of work.
In other words, this target value mandates that the 256-bit
output of the hash function starts with a certain number of
consecutive zeros. In the illustration, all hashes are shown to
start with three 0’s. For block 2, the same process is repeated
to obtain the nonce with the new block number and the data.
Also, Prev is updated with the Hash of the previous block.
Again, we observe that a different nonce is obtained and the
Hash begins with three consecutive 0’s. It is to be noted, as
the target value decreases, the difficulty of finding the nonce
increases.
Nonce
Data Data Data Data
Prev Prev Prev Prev
Hash HashHash
Block# Block# Block# Block#
Hash
NonceNonceNonce
1 2 3 4
42345 56848 5245566 875
Transactional 
record transactional transactional 
record recordrecord
transactional 
Some other Some other Some other
000000...000
00015e...76c 000a76...982 000129...b72
00015e...76c 000a76...982 000129...b72
00075e...237
Fig. 1: Chaining of blocks in blockchain
B. Private Blockchain
There exist some blockchains designed by different com-
panies for specific applications with restricted access to the
public. The most known private blockchains are part of the Hy-
perledger project which is a collaboration between many well-
known companies and hosted by the Linux foundation. Having
access to these blockchains or participating in their consensus
protocol is permissioned and dependent on a third-party.
Therefore, private blockchains are centralized to some extent
which is in contradiction to the original idea of blockchain
being decentralization and entirely distributed. However, these
blockchains have lower computational requirements and faster
3network response time which make them more desirable for
IoT applications. In some private blockchains, some of the
nodes have complete access to all the stored blocks in the
blockchains. Thus, private blockchains bring more privacy to
the information which is desirable for companies.
Private blockchains are more secure than traditional
databases because of using cryptographic protocols similar to
public blockchains. However, they are not as secure as pub-
lic blockchains that employ computational-intensive protocols
like proof of work. Thus, there is the possibility of tampering
stored data in private blockchains. It should be mentioned
that there exist some partially private blockchains called
consortium blockchains. While a fully private blockchain is
controlled by a single company, consortium blockchains are
governed by several institutions all of which directly partici-
pate in the consensus protocol. Private blockchains can follow
different consensus methods like practical Byzantine fault
tolerance, proof of elapsed time and proof of stake which have
been discussed in section V. Private and public blockchains
are compared in Fig. 2.
(a) Public Blockchain
(b) Private Blockchain
Fig. 2: Public blockchain vs private blockchain. In a private
blockchain, users’ access to the blockchain is restricted by an
institution.
III. IOT: IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS
We are witnessing the use of IoT networks in various
domestic, industrial and military applications. A common
feature of these IoT networks is that they consist of several
sensors and actuators which are resource-constrained devices
capable of communication without human intervention. Be-
sides these devices, there are other network entities that
connect the sensors and actuators to the backbone network
infrastructure. These are routers, switches, aggregators and
cloud infrastructure comprising virtual servers and storage–
all of which dictate the baseline requirements for resource
provisioning and sharing. These requirements include dynamic
and verifiable group membership of devices, authentication
and data integrity, robustness against single point of failure,
lightweight operations in terms of resources and low latency
communication [9].
A. Smart Homes: An example of an IoT Network
One of the first uses of IoTs has been the automation
of homes and cities which are referred as smart homes and
smart cities. A smart home involves creating a local network
consisting of various smart devices, sensors, and meters within
a house. This network is made accessible from anywhere
to the residents of the house through the Internet. One of
the main obstacles towards realizing this goal is securing
the communicated and stored data in this network against
malicious acts that desire to wreak havoc with someone’s
home.
In a smart home network, there is a significant amount
of data that is exchanged among different nodes. Electricity
meters need to access all the electrical appliances in the house.
It has to interact with the the smart car for charging and
discharging (during peak times, one might use the stored
energy in the car as a backup for electricity demands). The
HVAC system needs to communicate with the thermostat and
weather forecasting systems. Similarly, the fire extinguisher
receives signals from smoke detectors. All these connections,
including the residents need to remotely access the devices,
require exchange if data in a secure manner.
In addition, in a smart home, there is a need to store all the
communicated data among the devices and the current state
of each device and sensor for analysis and better decision
making. For example, historical data along with resident’s
power consumption habits can be used for for energy saving
decisions and recommendations. Also, some smart homes can
learn and adapt the device parameters based on historical
observations. In such cases, system logs are very instrumental
in accurate learning, model building, predictive analysis, and
decision making [10]. Needless to emphasize, the stored data
needs to be immune to data manipulation attacks.
Extending the concept of smart homes, one can imagine
of a smart city as large network connecting various smart
homes, smart transportation systems, smart power grids, smart
vehicles, and so on. Securing such a large network is a bigger
concern since any vulnerability in any of the smaller network
can be exploited to launch bigger attacks with significant
damages dues to cascading effects. Compared to a smart
home, a smart city’s requirements are more stringent and
demands even a more secure communication links and data
storage/exchange protocols.
Though there are many competing technologies that try
to immune communication links and stored data in smart
homes against attacks, blockchain has emerged as probably the
most promising one. In a blockchain, the data is immutable
because of the underlying consensus protocols. Therefore,
manipulation attacks on transmitted or stored data are not
plausible through a single compromised node and majority
4of nodes ought to be compromised for a successful attack [6].
The suitability of blockchain for IoT networks is discussed in
details in Section IV.
B. Current IoT Technologies and Limitations
Most of the existing IoT solutions rely on the centralized
server-client paradigm which are connected to cloud servers
via the Internet. Although these solutions are suitable for
the present day, considering the growth of IoT networks,
there is a demand for new solutions to make the network
more decentralized [11]. One of the suggested solutions is the
creation of large peer-to-peer (P2P) wireless sensor networks.
However, this solution does not adequately address the privacy
and security requirements for IoT networks [12], [13], [14].
Following are some of the main challenges for existing IoT
implementations that need to be to be adopted for large-scale
deployments.
• High cost: Most of the current IoT solutions require
centralized clouds and server farms which impose high
costs for deployment and maintenance. Also, these re-
quirements necessitate middlemen which would make the
infrastructure more centralized and costly.
• Maintenance: Apart from the high cost related to main-
tenance of millions of smart devices within the network,
applying required software updates to all of these devices
would be a considerable burden.
• Privacy: For extensive deployment of IoT networks, users
need to be assured about the privacy and anonymity of
their data. Some companies permit certain authorities
(i.e., governments, manufacturers or service providers) to
access and control users’ devices.
• Security: Existing IoT solutions use closed-source codes
which do not provide transparency to users. Future IoT
implementations would require utilization of open-source
codes so that all the users can maintain and update the
software making it less susceptible to malicious activities.
In addition, current IoT implementations are prone to
single point of failure. If a cloud server confronts a
physical or software malfunction, it may impact the
entire network functionality [15]. Also, a breach in a
single device connected to a server or the cloud can
wreak havoc with the entire system through denial of
service (DoS) attacks by sending malicious messages
to other devices, leaking private data, or manipulating
the gathered data [16], [17], [18], [19]. Collected data
from different devices is stored, processed and forwarded
by intermediate systems which can tamper the data. In
addition, wireless channels used for data broadcast are
unreliable which makes the network prone to jamming
attacks [20]. More detailed analysis of possible security
breaches in IoT networks are examined in [21] and [22].
On the other hand, all blockchain implementation have a
decentralized network which eliminate some of the current
IoT limitations like high cost and maintenance. In addition,
the inherent consensus methods used in different blockchain
implementations can address privacy and security issues in IoT
networks which are surveyed in section V.
IV. BLOCKCHAINS FOR IOT NETWORKS
Given the stringent requirements for IoT networks,
blockchain appears to be very apt for both i) securing the
network against manipulation attacks that target stored data
and ii) providing a secure platform for all devices in the
network to communicate with each other [23], [24]. Let us
discuss the shortcomings of the current models and what
promises do blockchain bring to the IoT paradigm.
A. Client-Server vs. P2P Models
Most of the currently used IoT networks are based on
the server-client model where all the devices are identified,
authenticated and connected via cloud servers requiring enor-
mous amount of processing capability and storage capacity.
In addition, all the communications between these devices
have to go through the Internet even if the devices are close
to each other. Though such a model is practical for small
IoT networks, it does not scale well. Furthermore, the cost
of establishing large number of communication links, main-
taining centralized clouds and networking all equipment, is
significant for large-scale IoT networks. Apart from the costs,
reliance on cloud servers make the architecture susceptible to
single point of failure. Moreover, IoT devices must be immune
to information attacks and physical tampering. Though some
of the existing methods make the IoT devices secure, they
are complex and not appropriate for resource-constrained IoT
devices with limited computation power [9].
B. Blockchain for Resource Constrained IoT Networks
Blockchain establishes a peer-to-peer network which de-
creases the cost of installation and maintenance of centralized
clouds, data centers and networking equipment by distributing
the computational and storage requirements among all the
devices within the network. This communication paradigm
solves the single point of failure problem. Blockchain ad-
dresses the privacy concerns for IoT networks by using cryp-
tographic algorithms. It also solves the reliability issues in IoT
networks by using tamper-resistant ledgers [9].
In spite of the built-in mechanisms that guarantee data
integrity in blockchain based systems, the implementation of
it in resource constrained IoT networks is challenging due
to the following reasons. First, computation of the crypto-
graphic hashes as part of the consensus method is compute-
intensive and demands immense CPU cycles. Second, the
communication links could become a bottleneck in delivering
the transactions to others and getting their approvals. The
problem is even more aggravated in an interference-limited
wireless system when all IoT devices have to vie for shared
radio links. Third, IoT networks consist of many devices that
need to communicate with each other very quickly and at all
times. This necessitates adding many blocks containing large
number of transactions to the blockchain every second which
requires low latency consensus methods.
Typically, resource constrained IoT systems have some
flexibility in their performance requirements and ready to
trade some level of data integrity for savings in computations
5and energy consumption. One of the ways to achieve that is
to relax the proof of work in order to reduce computations
requirements. Another way could be not to maintain all the
blocks since as the number of blocks increase, larger storage
is required. Rather, the last l blocks could be chained and
all computations could be performed on the last l blocks.
Though such techniques would not yield the level of data
integrity usually provided by cryptocurrencies, they would
nevertheless guarantee some reduced level of data protection.
Other ways to empower blockchain to be used for resource-
constrained IoT networks is to use consensus methods that
have significantly lower computational requirements, network
overhead and faster convergence. These methods are discussed
next.
V. CONSENSUS METHODS
There are several well-established methods by which dif-
ferent nodes in a blockchain network can reach consensus
over a new block. A blockchain based system is as secure
and robust as its underlying consensus method. The most
well-known consensus method is proof of work (discussed
in Section II) which is used by bitcoin. Proof of work has
proved to be an effective approach for cryptocurrencies over
years. However, due to its high computational and bandwidth
requirements, it does not seem to be practical for IoT networks.
Therefore, we present other existing consensus methods and
discuss the possibility of applying them to a blockchain based
IoT network. Then, we compare all the discussed consensus
protocols in Table I. The consensus protocols that are not
applicable to IoT networks or are mere modifications of a
general consensus method are discussed in brief.
A. Proof of Work (PoW)
There are some consensus methods that based on proof of
work. They are discussed next.
1) Proof of Capacity (PoC): Proof of Capacity is similar
to PoW but instead of depending on the computing power of
the miners, it relies on their hard disk capacity. Thus, it is
significantly more energy-efficient than ASICs mining used in
PoW. In PoC, miners have to store huge data sets, known as
plots, to get an opportunity to mine the next block. Therefore,
by storing more plots, a miner will have a higher probability to
solve the next block [2]. The block creation time in PoC is 4
minutes. PermaCoin and SpaceMint are two cryptocurrencies
employing PoC. Aside from the high latency, this method is
not a rational choice for IoT networks where the devices have
limited storage capacity.
2) Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET): Proof of Elapsed Time is
a consensus method proposed by Intel which works similar to
PoW but with significantly lower energy consumption. In this
method, miners have to solve a hash problem similar to that
of PoW. However, instead of a competition between miners to
solve the next block, the winning miner is randomly chosen
based on a random wait time. The winning miner is the one
whose timer expires first. The verification of correctness of
timer execution is done using a Trusted Execution Environ-
ment (TEE) like Intel’s Software Guard Extension (SGX) [25].
PoET’s eased computational requirements make it IoT
friendly. In addition, its low latency and high throughput make
it favorable for IoT networks. The main drawback of this ap-
proach is its dependency on Intel which is in conflict with the
basic philosophy of blockchain being entirely decentralized.
B. Proof of Stake (PoS)
This is the most prevalent method of consensus in the
blockchains used for cryptocurrencies after proof of work. This
method works similar to proof of work but with a significant
difference. It does not induce in a race amongst the nodes to
solve the next block. Instead of a competition between the
nodes to solve the next block, a node is chosen by lottery
to solve the next block. The node that will mine the next
block is chosen based on its proportional stake in the network
which is its wealth in terms of that cryptocurrency. The chosen
node will use a digital signature to prove its ownership over
the stake instead of solving a complicated hash problem. As
a result, this method does not require high computational
power. In this method, all the coins (i.e., the cryptocurrency)
are available from the first day and no mining reward or
coin creation exists and the miners are rewarded only with
a transaction fee [2].
Although this method eliminates the computational re-
quirements of proof of work, it creates new problems. This
method is contingent upon nodes with the highest amount
of stake which somehow makes the blockchain centralized.
Furthermore, there is another problem called “nothing at
stake” which refers to the situation in which a selected node
has nothing to lose if it behaves badly. Therefore, nothing
prevents a node from, for example, creating two sets of new
blocks to obtain more reward for transaction fees. However,
some modifications are applied to this method to deal with
these problems. Although, this method has significantly eased
computational requirements of proof of work, it is not yet
popular for resource constrained IoT networks. In addition,
this method and its variants (which are discussed below) are
based on monetary concepts (stakes) that does not exist in IoT
networks.
1) Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS): This method is based
on the proof of stake consensus method. Contrary to PoS
which is direct democratic, this method is representative
democratic [3] which means that all the stakeholders vote
to choose some nodes as witnesses and delegates. Witnesses
are responsible and rewarded for creating new blocks. The
delegates are responsible for maintaining the network and
proposing changes such as block sizes, transaction fees, or
reward amount. In each election round, N witnesses with the
highest votes are chosen. N is defined such that at least 50%
of the voting stakeholders believe there is enough decentral-
ization. It should be noted that the number of witnesses that
each stakeholder vote for, must be at least equal to their desired
number of witnesses for decentralization. In DPoS, there are
built-in mechanisms in place for detecting and voting out a
malicious delegate or witness [2], [26], [27].
Bitshares, a cryptocurrency, uses DPoS which has shown
to significantly improve throughput and latency compared to
6PoS, but at the cost of making the blockchain more centralized.
It is capable of processing 100,000 transactions per second
(TPS). In addition, a block is added to the blockchain in 1.5
seconds on average and in 3 seconds maximum [2], [26],
[27]. Though these features make DPoS very attractive for
IoT networks, the main bottleneck for DPoS in IoT networks
is its dependency on monetary concepts (stakes) to choose
witnesses and delegates.
2) Leased Proof of Stake (LPoS): Leased Proof of Stake
works the same way as PoS but with some improvements.
LPoS tries to solve the centrality problem in PoS. It enables
the nodes with low balances to participate in block verification
by adding a leasing option. Leasing allows the wealth holders
with higher balances to lease their funds for specific amount
of time to nodes with low balances. The leased amount will be
in possession of the wealth holders during the lease contract,
however, it will increase the chance of solving a block for
nodes with low balances. When these nodes solve a block, they
will share the reward with the wealth holders proportionally.
This approach makes blockchain more secure by making it
more decentralized [28]. Unfortunately, LPoS is not useful in
the context of IoT since it is based on monetary concepts
which is not necessarily applicable to an IoT network.
3) Proof of Importance (PoI): Proof of Importance is a
modified version of PoS where instead of considering only
nodes’ balances to determine the next winning node for solv-
ing the next block, it takes into account more factors including
a node’s reputation which is specified by a particular system
defined function and the number of transactions occurred to or
from that node. Therefore, this method of consensus considers
productive network activity of nodes which is more efficient
than only nodes’ balances [29]. The cryptocurrency NEM uses
PoI for consensus. PoI yields high throughout and exhibits
comparatively low latency. In addition, it does not require large
computational or network overheads. These features make PoI
favorable for IoT networks. However, PoI like other PoS-based
methods, is also dependent on monetary concepts.
4) Proof of Activity (PoA): Proof of Activity is a hybrid
method of consensus based on proof of work and proof
of stake [3]. First, miners try to solve a hash function in
a competition to find the next block as in proof of work.
However, the solved block will only contain a header and the
miner’s address without any transaction. Then, transactions
are added to the block and according to the solved block’s
header, a group of validators is chosen to sign the new block
in order to reach consensus. This step is done by using proof of
stake. This approach is safer against attacks but can experience
higher delay which might not be acceptable for delay-sensitive
IoT applications [2].
5) Casper: Casper is a PoS-based consensus protocol for
transitioning Ethereum’s consensus method from PoW to
PoS. It is an overlay on the existing PoW blockchain in
Ethereum [30]. It prevents “nothing at stake” attacks by
slashing all the attacker’s stakes. A modification of the Greedy
Heaviest Observed Subtree (GHOST) is used as the chain
selection rule in Casper. GHOST is proposed as an alternative
for the longest-chain rule used in the bitcoin blockchain. In
blockchain networks, there is a possibility for forks because
of the network delay. In those cases, the longest chain is
selected as the main chain and other branches are ignored. In
the GHOST protocol, at each fork, the heaviest subtree rooted
at the fork is selected in the chain [31], [32]. This method
provides significant benefits for cryptocurrencies in terms of
security and delay. However, they are not sufficient for tackling
the IoT challenges in comparison with the naive PoS method.
6) Proof of Burn (PoB): Proof of Burn is based on burning
coins which refers to sending coins to an irretrievable address.
Miners get priority to solve the next block according to the
amount of coins they have burnt [2]. While this approach is
practical for designing cryptocurrencies, it is not appropriate
for IoT applications since this method is contingent upon exis-
tence of a monetary framework and burning of coins, neither
of which is inherent in an IoT networks. A cryptocurrency
called Slimcoin uses PoB.
C. Byzantine Agreement Methods
These consensus methods are based on Byzantine generals
problem. In short, this problem is to come up with a consensus
method between Byzantine generals over the attack strategy
with the assumption that some generals may be traitors and try
to adopt treacherous actions to prevent loyal generals reach a
consensus and conquer the city. The scenario for this problem
is illustrated in Fig. 3. The followings are the Byzantine
Agreement-based consensus methods.
1) Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT): In this
method, all the nodes should participate in the voting process
in order to add the next block and the consensus is reached
when more than two-thirds of all nodes agree upon that block.
PBFT can tolerate malicious behavior from up to one-third
of all nodes to perform normally. For instance, in a system
with one malicious node, there should be at least 4 nodes
to reach a correct consensus. Otherwise, consensus is not
reached. In this method, the consensus is reached quicker and
more economically compared to proof of work. Also, it does
not require owning assets similar to proof of stake to take part
in the consensus process [2].
This method is well-suited for private blockchains like
the Hyperledger projects that are controlled by a third-party.
However, it is not the best choice for permissionless, public
blockchains due to their limited scalability and comparatively
low tolerance towards malicious activities. PBFT has high
throughput, low latency, and low computational overhead– all
of which are desirable for IoT networks. However, its high
network overhead makes it un-scalable for large networks, thus
it could be applied only to small IoT networks.
2) Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (dBFT): Delegated
Byzantine Fault Tolerance follows the same rules as PBFT but
it does not require participation of all the nodes for adding a
block which make it more scalable. In dBFT, some nodes are
chosen as delegates of other nodes and according to some
rules, they pursue the consensus protocol similar to PBFT [3].
A cryptocurrency called NEO uses this method of consensus.
7Fig. 3: Byzantine problem with 3 generals. PBFT can only tolerate
malicious activity by less than 1/3 of nodes. In this example, general
3 is traitor who can prevent the loyal generals to a reach consensus in
case they have different opinions by sending them a different decision
from their own decisions. Here, loyal general 1 decides to attack and
loyal general 2 decides to retreat. Traitor general 3 uses the arisen
opportunity from loyal generals’ conflict of opinions and sends them
two different messages containing a decision in contrast with their
own decisions. Therefore, based on the received messages, general 1
decides to retreat and general 2 decides to attack.
This method has many desirable features similar to that of
PBFT. However, its average latency for block creation is 15
seconds which is not acceptable for an IoT network.
3) Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP): Stellar Consensus
Protocol provides micro-finance services on the blockchain
platform. It was proposed by Mazieres using a variant of
PBFT called federated byzantine fault tolerance (FBFT) as
the backbone [33]. In FBFT, nodes belonging to intersecting
groups (i.e., the federates) run a local consensus protocol
among their members [34]. This method is decentralized and
is open to the public which allows everyone to participate in
the consensus protocol. It has a very low latency similar to
web transactions (a few seconds at most). This is the first
Byzantine agreement based consensus method which provides
users with the maximum freedom to choose among different
combinations of other participants to trust in order to reach a
consensus.
SCP reaches robustness through quorum slices. A quorum
is a set of nodes that participate in the consensus protocol and
a quorum slice is its subset that helps a node in its agreement
process. Individual trust decisions made by participants in
the blockchain constructs a quorum slice, and quorum slices
connect the whole network together in a similar fashion as
peering networks create the Internet by binding together. It
should be noted that the quorums are selected by the nodes
involved in the transactions.
SCP consists of two steps: nomination protocol and ballot
protocol. First, nomination protocol is executed. During this
step, new values called candidate values are proposed for
agreement. These values are sent to all the nodes in the quorum
and each of them will vote for a single value among the
candidate values. At the end of process, unanimously values
are chosen for that slot. Then, ballot protocol is initiated
which involves a federated voting to either accept or abort
the obtained values in the nomination protocol. Finally, the
ballot for the current slot is finalized and aborted ballots are
discarded. In situations that nodes cannot reach a consensus
to abort or to commit a value, a higher valued ballot is
initiated which can be considered as a new ballot protocol
execution [33], [35].
High throughput and low computational requirements of this
method are desirable for IoT networks. Although its latency
is comparatively low, it is not in order of milliseconds which
is required for IoT networks. If the latency of this method
could be decreased by reducing the network overhead (which
is O(n)), this method can be a good choice for IoT networks.
4) Ripple: Similar to Stellar, Ripple uses FBFT con-
sensus method. It is proposed to reduce the latency of
blockchains [36]. In this decentralized method, each miner
uses a trusted subset of nodes within the larger network
to reach a consensus. There are two types of nodes in the
network: server nodes which are responsible for the consensus
protocol and client nodes which only transfer funds. Each
server node contains an Unique Node List (UNL). Nodes
within an UNL are used for reaching consensus over new
transactions. When 80% of the nodes within an UNL agree
over a transaction, the consensus is reached.
The Ripple consensus protocol is executed every few sec-
onds by all the nodes in order to reach consensus over new
transactions. Ripple can tolerate up to 20% faulty nodes in the
UNL [37]. This method is mostly used for monetary purposes
to enable transactions with no chargebacks [38]. It has similar
features as Stellar which makes it a good candidate for IoT
networks if its latency is decreased to order of milliseconds.
5) Tendermint: Tendermint belongs to a family of Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus protocols which can host
arbitrary application states [39]. It is a permissioned consensus
method [37]. Contrary to PBFT where each node has equal
voting power, in Tendermint nodes have different voting pow-
ers that are proportional to their stakes [34]. Therefore, it can
be considered as a hybrid consensus method based on PBFT
and PoS. Tendermint can tolerate malicious activity from at
most one-third of the total byzantine voting power [40].
Participants in the Tendermint protocol are called validators
which propose blocks of transactions and vote on them in
turn. The voting process consists of two steps: pre-vote and
pre-commit. A block is added to the blockchain when more
than two-thirds of validators pre-commit for the same block
in the same round [41]. Unlike PBFT, validators are chosen
based on PoS by locking their coins and dishonest validators
are punished [42]. Thus, this method relies on monetary
concepts like PoS which is not necessarily applicable to IoT
networks. Considering high scalability, high throughput, and
low latency, this method could be moulded for IoT networks if
the monetary concept can be replaced by some other criteria.
86) ByzCoin: ByzCoin is a byzantine consensus that uses
a collective signing protocol called CoSi [43] to commit
bitcoin transactions within seconds and makes PBFT scalable.
It also modifies PBFT to enable a public blockchain by
supporting dynamic membership proportional to PoW as in
bitcoin. This method uses a tree-structured communication
protocol which significantly reduces the latency of bitcoin’s
blockchain. However, it is vulnerable to DoS attacks [44].
This method yields a throughput higher than the Paypal
network with a confirmation latency of 15-20 seconds [44].
Although scalability and throughput of this method is desirable
for IoT networks, its latency is beyond the acceptable limits
of IoT networks. Furthermore, the PoW used in this method is
similar to that of bitcoin [44] which is again not appropriate
for IoT devices.
D. VRF-based methods
In verifiable random function (VRF)-based methods, com-
mittee members are randomly selected for participation in the
consensus protocol [45]. Algorand and Dfinity are two such
methods.
1) Algorand: Algorand is a novel public and permission-
less blockchain implementation that uses pure proof of stake
(PPoS) consensus protocol built on byzantine agreement [46].
Algorand has been proposed as a new cryptocurrency to ad-
dress limitations of existing implementations: decentralization,
scalability, and security. Most of the available blockchain
implementations are centralized to some degree; i.e., in a
bitcoin network, the users with the highest hash power control
the network. However, in Algorand, each block is approved
by a unique committee of users that are randomly selected
by VRFs in a private and non-interactive fashion using the
users’ private key and public information from the blockchain.
Thus, it is fully decentralized. This selection is based on users’
weights assigned according to the amount of money in their
account. This step is based on proof of stake [47].
After the committee members are selected, the committee
reaches a consensus over the new block using a byzantine
agreement protocol called BA?. Existing byzantine fault tol-
erance protocols need a fixed set of servers to be determined
ahead of time which makes them vulnerable to Sybil attacks,
where an adversary creates many pseudonyms to affect the
Byzantine agreement protocol. In addition, they do not scale
to a large number of users. However, BA? eliminates the risk
of Sybil attacks and can scale to millions of users because
of the existing first step in Algorand. BA? can tolerate up
to 1/3 of weighted users (1/3 of the money owned by users)
to be malicious like any other BFT based methods. However,
because of using randomly selected VRFs in the first step,
adversaries do not know which users to attack until they start
participating in BA? which significantly increases the security
of the consensus protocol [47].
The main drawback of Algorand is that the randomness used
in producing the VRF seeds can be biased by an adversary.
To overcome this shortcoming, it uses a look-back mechanism
to ensure strong synchrony and unbiased seeds. However, this
makes the network vulnerable to “nothing at stake” attack [48].
Latency of Algorand is less than a minute with transaction
finality of around one minute. This feature is very desirable
for a cryptocurrency. For instance, in bitcoin network it takes
about 10 minutes to grow a chain by one block and it requires
to wait for 6 blocks to ensure transaction finality (transaction
be on an authoritative chain) which takes about an hour. There
is not also a possibility of fork in Algorand [46], [47].
Although Algorand propounds a bright horizon for financial
purposes, it lacks several features to be successfully applied
to IoT networks. Algorand does not require communication
among users to determine if they are selected to participate
in the consensus protocol. It also does not postulate com-
putational resources to solve cryptographic puzzles. These
characteristics alongside with decentralization, high scalability,
and high security are appealing features of Algorand for IoT.
However, an IoT network requires a delay less than a second
(in order of milliseconds). Furthermore, there is no monetary
concept in an IoT network to define stakes and assign weights.
2) Dfinity: Dfinity blockchain proposes a four-layer con-
sensus protocol which can be used for permissioned networks
or paired with Sybil resistance methods (e.g., proof-of-work
or proof-of-stake) for permissionless and public networks. The
most important feature of Dfinity is containing decentralized
randomness beacon acting as the VRFs to produce random
outputs as the seed. This new VRF protocol is based on a
unique-deterministic, non-interactive, DKG-friendly threshold
signature scheme which solves the biased coin problem and
“nothing at stake” problem which exist in Algorand. Dfinity
consensus is also immune to selfish mining attacks [49].
Dfinity can reach consensus over a new block in seconds
and transaction finality after two confirmations [49]. Similar
to Algorand, this high latency is not acceptable for IoT
applications.
E. Sharding-based methods
Sharding is splitting the overheads of processing trans-
actions among multiple, smaller groups of nodes called
shards [48]. These methods were initially proposed to ad-
dress the scalability problems in blockchain. Shards work
in parallel to maximize the performance of the blockchain
(processing more transactions in each consensus round) by
sharding different overheads of blockchain network including
communication, computation, and storage overhead. The stat-
of-the-art sharding methods are discussed below.
1) RSCoin: RSCoin is a cryptocurrency framework pro-
posed for centrally-banked cryptocurrencies to maintain com-
plete control over the monetary supply using distributed set
of authorities called mintettes (validator nodes). It uses a
sharding-based approach to make traditional banking systems
(with centralized monetary supply) more transparent via a
distributed network while maintaining the scalability of the
network. Danezis and Meiklejohn claim that their framework
avoids double-spending [50]. However, its two-phase commit
protocol is not Byzantine fault tolerant and is susceptible
to double-spending attacks by a colluding adversary [48].
Moreover, this framework is not decentralized as it is asserted
since it relies on a trusted source of randomness for sharding.
9Although this framework has a very low latency (in the
order of milliseconds) and high throughput [50], it is not
applicable for IoT networks. It is mostly centralized and based
on a centralized monetary supply which has no place in an IoT
network.
2) Elastico: This is the first sharding-based consensus pro-
tocol proposed for public and permissionless blockchains that
uses a combination of classical byzantine consensus protocol
(e.g., PBFT) and proof of work to improve bitcoin blockchain.
It partitions the network into smaller committees which pro-
cess disjoint set of transactions (shards). The number of com-
mittees grows near linearly in the total computational power of
the network. Each committee contains a small number of nodes
that reach a consensus over their set of transactions (shard)
using classical byzantine consensus. In each consensus round,
these committees are selected using PoW’s least-significant
bits which are obtained by each node solving a PoW puzzle
based on the consensus epoch randomness obtained from the
last state of the blockchain [51].
Although this method can enhance latency and throughput
of the bitcoin blockchain, it confronts several limitations: (i)
It still suffers from a large communication overhead which is
troublesome for IoT networks. (ii) The randomness used dur-
ing each consensus epoch can be biased by an adversary which
compromises the committee selection process. (iii) While each
node is responsible for verifying a subset of transactions (a
shard), it still has to broadcast all blocks to other nodes and
store the entire ledger which does not address communication
overhead and resource-constrained IoT devices. (iv) It can only
tolerate up to 1/4 faulty nodes [48].
Unfortunately, Elastico does not seem practical for IoT
implementations for several reasons: (i) While improving
bitcoin’s latency, the latency is still large enough for IoT
networks. (ii) It has very large communication overhead. (iii)
The storage requirements are not minimalist. (iv) There are
still security issues.
3) OmniLedger: OmniLedger is a permissionless and pub-
lic blockchain implementation that uses VRFs and sharding
with a ByzCoin-based consensus protocol called ByzCoinX.
It has been proposed by Kokoris-Kogias et. al. to address some
of the limitations of Elastico, specially latency and scalability.
ByzCoinX improves the PBFT part of ByzCoin in order to
increase its tolerance to DoS attacks. During each consensus
epoch, the committee selection process is done by VRFs in a
similar fashion as the lottery algorithm of Algorand. These
committees reach a consensus over a subset of transaction
(a shard). Similar to Elastico, it can tolerate only up to 1/4
faulty nodes. When there are less than 1/8 faulty nodes, this
method can reach a comparatively low latency (less than 10
seconds) [52].
Aside from the undesirable latency of this protocol for IoT
networks and its security issues, this method poses a large
communication overhead which cannot be implemented on
resource-constrained IoT devices. In OmniLedger’s consensus
protocol, each committee has to communicate with all the
nodes for each block of transaction. In addition, there is
another communication overhead during producing the random
seed for the VRF [48]. However, OmniLedger provides low
storage overhead since validators are not required to store the
full transaction history which is in favor of IoT devices [52].
4) RapidChain: RapidChain has been proposed to solve
existing limitations of sharding-based consensus methods in-
cluding communication overhead, security, scalability and
latency. Unlike other sharding-based methods which have
limited tolerance to Byzantine faults, it can tolerate up to 1/3
faulty nodes without any trusted setup. RapidChain is the first
public blockchain that provides full sharding: communication,
computation, and storage overhead. This method significantly
enhances latency and throughput by eliminating the need for
linear amount of communication per transaction. This protocol
does not require gossiping transactions to the entire network
which improves the communication overhead [48].
The full sharding used in this method is very desirable for
resource constrained IoT devices to successfully participate in
the consensus protocol. In addition, RapidChain has a high
throughput (processing 7,380 transaction per second in a net-
work of 4,000 nodes). However, its latency for confirming the
transactions is not suitable for IoT networks (8.7 seconds for
4,000 nodes). If the latency of this method can be improved,
it would be a worthy option for IoT networks [48].
F. Raft
Raft is a voting-based consensus method that was pro-
posed to make Paxos algorithm more understandable and
implementable for practical systems. Paxos algorithm tries
to solve the consistency problem in certain conditions for
Byzantine Generals Problem. Raft achieves the same efficiency
as Paxos [39], [53]. Raft and Paxos are non-Byzantine fault
tolerance algorithms. While their protocols are similar to BFT
algorithms, they can only tolerate crash faults up to 50% of
the nodes while Byzantine algorithms can tolerate arbitrary
(including maliciously) corrupted nodes. It is composed of
two stages: leader election and log replication. The leader is
responsible for ordering the transactions. The leader selection
stage is executed using a randomized timeout for each server
when an existing leader fails. When a leader is chosen, log
replication stage is triggered. In this stage, the leader accepts
log entries from clients and broadcasts transactions to make its
version of the transaction log [39], [54]. Corda and Quorum
are two blockchain implementations that use Raft as their
consensus method [34].
This method has high throughput and low latency. How-
ever, its throughput and performance depend on the leader
node which occupies an absolute dominance in the system.
Therefore, if the leader node is maliciously infected, the entire
system will be destroyed. It cannot tolerate malicious nodes
and can endure 50% nodes of crash fault [53]. Since it is
crucial to secure the leader node, the throughput is limited
by the performance of that node. Due to its low security
and restricted throughput, it is not very appropriate for IoT
networks.
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TABLE I: Comparisons of different consensus methods [37], [38], [42], [48], [52], [53], [55], [56]
.
Consensus Accessibility1 Decentral- Scalability Through-
2
Latency3 Adversary Computing Network Storage IoTmethod ization put tolerance overhead overhead overhead suitability
PoW Public, High High Low High <25% High Low HighPL. Computing Power
PoC Public, High High Low High N/A Low Low Very HighPL.
PoET Private, Medium High High Low N/A Low Low HighP. or PL.
PoS Public High High Low Medium <51% Medium Low HighP. or PL. Stakes
DPoS Public, Medium High High Medium <51% Medium N/A HighPL. Validators
LPoS Public High High Low Medium <51% Medium Low HighPL. Stakes
PoI Public High High High Medium <51% low Low HighPL. importance
PoA Public, High High Low Medium <51% High Low HighPL. Online Stakes
Casper Public, High High Medium Medium <51% Medium Low HighPL. Validators
PoB Public, High High Low High <25% Medium Low HighPL. Computing Power
PBFT Private, Medium Low High Low <33% Low High HighP. Faulty Replicas
dPBFT Private, Medium High High Medium <33% Low High HighP. Faulty Replicas
Stellar Public, High High High Medium Variable Low Medium HighPL.
Ripple Public High High High Medium <20% Low Medium HighPL. Faulty UNL nodes
Tendermint Private, Medium High High Low <33% Low High HighP. Voting power
ByzCoin Public, High high high Medium <33% high Medium highPL. Faulty Replicas
Algorand Public, High High Medium Medium <33% Low High HighPL. Weighted Users
Dfinity Public, High High N/A Medium N/A Low N/A N/AP. or PL.
RSCoin Private, Low High High Low N/A Low Medium HighP.
Elastico Public, High High Low High <25% Medium High HighPL. Faulty VAlidators
OmniLedger Public, High High High Medium <25% Medium Medium LowPL. Faulty Validators
RapidChain Public, High High High Medium <33% Medium Low LowPL. Faulty Validators
Raft Private, Medium High High Low <50% Low N/A HighP. crash fault
Tangle Public, Medium High High Low <33% Low Low LowPL. Computing Power
G. Tangle
Tangle is a new technology for distributed ledgers proposed
by the cryptocurrency Iota. Tangle does not require a compli-
cated, time consuming and computational-intensive consensus
protocol. It also does not use blocks to store transactions. Each
transaction is a unique block by itself which must approve two
older transactions in order to be added to the ledger. Tangle
uses Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) in which each transaction
is linked to two older transactions which are approved by it.
After a transaction approves two older transactions, it is added
to the ledger through proof of work. The tangle framework
is illustrated in Fig. 4. Tip nodes, indicated by solid black
squares, are the new transactions waiting for approval. The
approved transactions are shown by the white squares. Note,
1PL. denotes permissionless and P. denotes Permissioned.
2Low throughput is less than 100 TPS (transaction per second), medium
throughput is between 100 TPS and 1000 TPS, and high throughput is
more than 1000 TPS.
2High latency is in order of minutes, medium latency is in order of
seconds, and low latency is on order of milliseconds.
each transaction is linked to two older transactions.
Due to the unique design of tangle, it is a fast, infinitely scal-
able framework which makes it well-suited for IoT networks.
Furthermore, Tangle has no transaction fees which is desirable
for an IoT network. In contrast to most of the blockchain
implementations, tangle is immune to becoming obsolete with
the advent of quantum computers because of its unique design.
The main challenge about tangle is how to choose the two
older transactions for approval. No rule is imposed by tangle
on how to choose these two nodes which is very desirable
for resource-constrained devices in an IoT network. However,
the chosen transactions should not be the same or conflicting.
To choose between conflicting transactions, tangle runs an
algorithm called tip selection algorithm multiple times to
figure out which of these two transactions are more plausible
to be indirectly approved by the selected tip.
Unlike blockchain frameworks, tangle’s design enables par-
allel transaction verification which eliminates the required
wait time for mining previous blocks as in blockchain and
provides the opportunity to verify more transactions in a
11
Tip  node
Approved  node
Fig. 4: Tangle protocol
shorter time. Although tangle is very promising and claims to
overcome the existing barriers for decentralization of resource-
constrained IoT networks [5], it confronts a lot of imple-
mentation challenges, specifically for IoT applications. The
current implementation of tangle, Iota, does not provide all the
claimed goals of tangle. One of the challenges for applying
tangle to IoT networks is the storage limitation. The resource
constrained IoT devices are unable to store the entire tangle.
Some solutions including automated snapshotting and a swarm
client have been proposed to address this problem in Iota’s
development road map [57]. Another problem with tangle is
that whoever gains control over more than one-third hash
power of tangle can make it insecure and vulnerable. As a
preventive measure, Iota runs a node called ‘coordinator’ by
amassing the hash power itself at one point. However, this can
be perceived as centralization of tangle.
H. Comparisons of Different Consensus Methods
The above mentioned consensus methods have been used
in various blockchain implementations. The consensus method
is the backbone of a blockchain implementation. Thus, most
of the features and performance attributes of a blockchain
implementation are contingent upon the method of consensus
used [53].
Researchers mostly propose new consensus protocols based
on the cryptocurrency requirements. The most important fea-
tures for a cryptocurrency are high throughput and security
while for IoT networks, low latency is the most significant
feature. In a practical IoT network, a transaction should be sent
and finalized within a few milliseconds or less. In table I, all
the mentioned consensus methods are compared to verify their
applicability to IoT networks. Most appropriate consensus
methods for IoT networks are denoted with , partially apt
consensus methods are denoted with , and not applicable
methods to IoT networks are denoted with .
VI. OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATIONS
In order to achieve a blockchain based IoT network, the
most appropriate framework must be designed and deployed.
One option is to implement a new framework and use the
preferred method of consensus which we believe best suits
the IoT application requirements. The other option is to use
an already defined framework. In this section, we review some
of the available frameworks for implementing a blockchain
system and their practical applicability towards an IoT appli-
cation. We survey different aspects of these implementations
including their method of consensus, their applications, being
permissioned or permissionless, being private or public. All
these features affect the characteristics of a blockchain frame-
work along with its scalability, performance and availability.
Scalability refers to the size of a blockchain network and
number of users it can support. Performance refers to the
latency and throughput which are critical for IoT networks.
Latency is the amount of time it takes for the nodes reach to
a consensus. Low latency can be achieved by compromising
the decentralization of the blockchain framework. Throughput
is the number of transactions that can be processed per time
unit. Availability refers to the accessibility of the nodes to a
copy of the distributed ledger [3].
The various private blockchain implementations are pre-
sented in Section VI-A. One of the well-known frameworks
for implementing a private blockchain based system is the
Hyperledger framework. Hyperledger is a collaborative project
started by the Linux Foundation and developed by many
companies including IBM, Intel, Cisco, Hitachi and so on.
It contains several projects including fabric, sawtooth, indy,
iroha and burrow. IBM blockchain for IoT is another private
blockchain implementation. As part of the public blockchain
based system, we discuss the well-known ones: ethereum and
bitcoin in Section VI-B We also survey the implementations
for alternative technologies for blockchain including corda
and iota in Section VI-C. We compare the most promising
frameworks for IoT applications in Section VI-D.
A. Private Blockchains
Hyperledger Fabric: Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned
implementation which is widely used by enterprises. It uses
a pluggable method of consensus which is defined based on
specific application requirements. Its most common method
of consensus is PBFT. Unlike bitcoin and ethereum which
are public blockchains, this private blockchain framework
attains consensus within hundreds of milliseconds [58]. Such
low latency is crucial for building blockchain based IoT
networks. Being permissioned, the blockchain is controlled
by a specific organization which allows specific nodes to join
the blockchain, access to the database and participate in the
consensus protocol. This framework supports chaincode
designed in the Go language which is a special version
of smart contracts [59]. Smart contract is a self-executing
software written in a programming language that allows users
to program their own scripts for transferring financial assets,
products, or services between different parties without a mid-
dleman [60]. Although low latency of this implementation
is a noticeable advantage for IoT networks, it remains a
private blockchain and therefore lacks the beneficial features
of public blockchains such as being totally distributed with
highly secure and immutable data storage. Furthermore, the
network overhead for this framework significantly increases
with increase in the number of nodes which causes the number
of messages communicated in the PBFT protocol to increase.
This prevents hyperledger fabric to be used in large scale
applications similar to public blockchains.
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Hyperledger fabric consists of several entities that maintain
the blockchain: peers, orderer, chaincode and chaincode pol-
icy. Peers are responsible for validating and performing the
requests by the nodes within the network. The validation of
new blocks is also the responsibility of the peers. The orderer
receives all the valid invoke requests called transactions from
nodes, creates a block from of these transactions, sends them
to peers to be verified, and adds to their copies of the ledger.
These invoke requests are first verified by one or more of
the corresponding peers which are dedicated according to the
defined policy in the chaincode. Thereafter, these requests
are sent to the orderer for further process. Different kinds of
messages can be defined on the chaincode by which nodes
propagate different requests to peers. The most used messages
for a chaincode are query and invoke. Query is getting to know
the current state of the ledger which is like asking the current
value of a variable assigned to a node. Invoke is requesting
a change in the ledger which is like changing the value of a
variable assigned to a node [61].
Hyperledger Sawtooth: Proposed by Intel, Hyperledger Saw-
tooth is a modular platform for implementation of distributed
ledgers for storing digital records aptly designed for enterprise
usage. It uses proof of elapsed time using Intel’s Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) as a trusted execution environment
for achieving consensus. This platform allows large scale im-
plementation of both permissioned and permissionless ledgers,
and has features such as live data stream, hardware security
and enterprise-grade customer load which make it suitable
for IoT devices [62]. However, this framework is not yet
implemented in large scale and fully tested for its performance
capabilities. It is also not recommended by Intel to be used
for security sensitive applications due to its lack of security
mechanisms.
Hyperledger Indy: Hyperledger Indy is a distributed ledger
framework designed specifically for decentralized identities
to prevent digital identity breaches on the Internet. It utilizes
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) to avoid inessential revelation
of identity features. It is a permissioned blockchain but with
global public access to its features. For validating new blocks,
it uses an approach called Plenum in which a set of validator
nodes run a modified, redundant Byzantine fault tolerant
protocol [25]. There is no striking aspect of Hyperledger Indy
that makes it attractive for an IoT network.
Hyperledger Iroha: Hyperledger Iroha is a simple implemen-
tation that focuses on mobile application development of
blockchain technology [62]. It is developed in C++ and uses
a new method of consensus called Sumeragi which is a chain-
based Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm. In this
framework, data storage and synchronization are performed
off-device [25]. In Iroha, every participant is not permitted
to access to entire data history. The participants can gain
access to data through query by getting permission and being
authenticated [63].
Hyperledger Burrow: Hyperledger Burrow is a permissioned
blockchain that uses Tendermint consensus method for achiev-
ing consensus [64]. It was first designed by a company called
Monax. Its design is based on Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM). It is a general-purpose smart contract machine for
cross-industry applications and is not an optimal framework
for a single industry [25]. The main drawback of this imple-
mentation is that if one-third or more number of validators
become offline, the network may halt [63].
IBM Watson IoT: Based on Hyperledger Fabric project, IBM
Watson IoT is private blockchain framework for IoT networks
proposed by IBM [65]. Though very appropriate for small
scale IoT networks, scalability remains the main drawback.
Each participant has the full solution functionality up to
10 routes (IoT to Blockchain connections), with up to 1
transaction per second per route.
B. Public Blockchains
Bitcoin: The well know cryptocurrency, bitcoin, utilizes a
permissionless public blockchain framework. Being permis-
sionless, it allows any node to participate in the consensus
protocol and mine blocks without any permission. It uses proof
of work as the method for consensus which has a high latency
about 10 minutes, making it ineffective for IoT networks.
However, it is worth exploring if it can still be used with
eased proof of work to reach a consensus in a short time.
Alternatively, this framework can be used in in combination
with other methods. Another significant challenge in applying
bitcoin blockchain to IoT networks is its scalability. Average
transaction size for bitcoin is between 400 Bytes and 600
Bytes. Considering the size of each bitcoin’s block which is
1 MB and the average time to solve each block which is 10
minutes, current bitcoin architecture allows 4 transactions per
second which is not acceptable for IoT networks.
Ethereum: Ethereum is a permissionless public blockchain
framework developed using solidity which is a contract-
oriented, high-level language for implementing smart con-
tracts [66]. All the nodes are required to participate in the
consensus process. It was primarily designed using a derivative
of proof of work known as Ethash. This method is signifi-
cantly less computational-intensive than the original proof of
work because of using Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). This
blockchain can be customized and adopted for a variety of
applications because of its intrinsic characteristics that enable
smart contracts [58]. There are plans for migrating Ethereum
to Casper [3]. Its block generation process takes between 10 to
20 seconds which is much less than bitcoin’s latency but still is
not practical for an IoT network implementation [58]. It should
be noted that some private and permissioned blockchain frame-
works are also designed based on the Ethereum blockchain.
C. Blockchain Alternatives
Corda: Corda is a permissioned decentralized ledger frame-
work that uses pluggable method of consensus. In this imple-
mentation, specific nodes called notary nodes are responsible
for the consensus protocol. Due to the requirement of trusting
the notaries for consensus, it is partially decentralized. It
cannot be considered as a blockchain framework since it uses a
different architecture. This framework is specifically designed
13
TABLE II: Comparisons of various blockchain implementations
Features
Implement. Hyperledger Hyperledger Bitcoin Ethereum Corda IotaFabric Sawtooth
Consensus method Pluggable Proof of Proof of Ethash (PoW) Pluggable Tangle(PBFT generally) elapsed time Work Casper (PoS) (Raft generally)
Accessibility Private Private Public Public Private Public
Mode of operation Permissioned Permissioned or Permissionless Permissioned or Permissioned PermissionlessPermissionless Permissionless
Decentralization Partially Partially Yes Yes Partially Partially
Compute-intensive No No Yes Partially No No
Network-intensive Yes No No No No No
Scalability Low High High High Partially High
Throughput High High Very low Low High High
Latency 100 ms Very Low 10 Minutes 12 Seconds Very Low 10 msNot Measured
Immutability Low Low High High High High
Adversary tolerance 33.33% Unverified <25% <51% unverified 33.33%Faulty Replicas Computing Power Stakes Computing Power
Privacy High High Low Low High Low
Smart contract Yes Yes Limited Yes Yes No
Currency None but None but Bitcoin (BTC) Ether (ETH), None IotaTokens possible Tokens possible Tokens possible
for financial applications and not very suitable for resource
constrained IoT networks [66].
Iota: Iota is a distributed ledger that uses Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG) instead of a blockchain. This protocol is called
Tangle which was discussed in section V-G. Its fast speed
of transactions is very desirable for IoT applications and is
the first cryptocurrency which has been specifically designed
for IoT applications. This design minimizes the transaction
time and network overhead at the cost of relaxing security
with some possible attack scenarios [58]. Iota does not have
any transaction fee which enables micro transactions. Unlike
other cryptocurrencies that use a number of confirmations
as an indicator for the reliability of a transaction, Iota uses
cumulative weight which is defined for each transaction based
on the number of consecutive linked transactions to it [5].
In Iota, all the tokens have been made available from the first
day and they were released by the first node called the genesis
transaction.
D. Comparisons of Various Implementations
In order to assess which implementation addresses most of
the limitations of blockchain and is applicable to IoT networks,
we compare six implementations in Table II. A desirable
blockchain implementation for IoT networks should have the
following features: decentralized, not compute-intensive, not
network-intensive, high scalability, high throughput, very low
latency and preserving privacy. We do not compare Indy,
Iroha, Burrow and IBM Watson since they have been primarily
designed for specific purposes and are not necessarily suitable
for IoT networks. Moreover, these frameworks have not yet
been fully developed and implemented.
The mentioned features in Table II for Hyperledger Saw-
tooth are claimed in theory and they are not yet fully tested in
a large scale implementation under different circumstances. In
addition, Hyperledger Sawtooth is still under experiment and
not recommended by Intel to be used for security sensitive
applications. High throughput and low latency of Hyperledger
Fabric is in small-scale implementations and for large-scale
networks they will deteriorate. The latency values in Table II
are average values. Bitcoin and Ethereum have high scala-
bility only with very limited network throughput. In Corda
framework, a new transaction is dependent on many other
transactions and if a node has not seen older transactions
formerly will result in a significant high latency which pose
some restrictions on scalability. However, generally, its latency
is very low. Furthermore, it is claimed in Corda’s white paper
that it is secure against adversarial attacks which is not tested
and implemented yet. Low tolerance of Iota’s framework
against adversarial activities is solved by using a special node
called coordinator.
VII. OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Considering the unique features of blockchain, it can be
applied to a number of domains including but not limited
to IoT networks, healthcare, data storage, inventory tracking
and finance. The primary challenge is how to adapt the
blockchain technology to suit the specific application needs.
As every application poses different requirements, a new or
a customized implementation of blockchain is needed. In the
IoT domain, the major research challenges that ought to be
addressed are:
• Enhancing scalability: Scalability refers to the size of
a blockchain network and the number of users it can
support. In a practical IoT network, a large number
of devices need to communicate through the network.
Enhancing scalability using the current implementations,
jeopardize throughput and latency.
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• Guaranteeing security: There are lots of malicious activ-
ities that target IoT networks. A practical IoT network
postulates immunity to all of the plausible attacks. Cur-
rent state of the art security methods rely on sophisti-
cated computations. Therefore, securing a network with
resource-constrained devices unable to perform heavy-
duty computations is a challenge.
• Protecting data privacy: The communicated data be-
tween different entities are confidential. Therefore, pre-
serving privacy in communication links is a necessity.
Making a blockchain-based IoT network more private,
usually endanger the basic paradigm of decentralization
in blockchains.
• Increasing throughput: In an IoT network, a large number
of devices are required to simultaneously communicate
with each other which necessitates a network with high
throughput. Increasing throughput in current implemen-
tations usually reduces scalability which is not desirable.
• Reducing latency: In a practical IoT network, different
devices need to communicate with each other in real-
time. Therefore, the latency should be very low. Reducing
latency in current implementations usually compromises
scalability, which is not acceptable.
• Reducing computational requirements: IoT devices are
mostly resource-constrained. Current state of the art secu-
rity protocols mostly rely on sophisticated cryptographic
computations which is a burden for resource-constrained
devices.
• Overcoming storage limitations: Resource-constrained
IoT devices cannot store huge amounts of data which
is usually a requirement for blockchain based networks.
This is because, several nodes or sometimes all the nodes
are typically required to have a copy of the blockchain.
In order to successfully apply blockchain to IoT networks,
practically feasible solutions are required that are scalable to
large networks and yield high throughput with low latency.
In addition, the implementations need to be highly secure
in order to defend against possible attacks and be tamper-
resistant. Besides, the implementations should be compati-
ble with resource-constrained IoT devices that have limited
computational capability and restricted storage capacity. Each
of the discussed consensus methods and implementations
addresses several of the above mentioned issues. However,
there remains the need for implementations that address all
the mentioned challenges.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we discussed the possibilities of using
blockchain for securing and assuring data integrity in IoT
networks. In particular, we focused on the currently used con-
sensus methods and their practical applicability for resource
constrained IoT devices and networks. We discussed the pros
and cons of current consensus methods used in blockchain
implementations. We also discussed how private blockchains
and tangle can be a better alternative to public blockchains for
IoT networks.
Among the discussed implementations of blockchain, Hy-
perledger Fabric, Sawtooth, Iota, and Ethereum appear more
promising for IoT networks and applications since they have
addressed some of the existing limitations of blockchain. Each
of these implementations have addressed some of the limita-
tions including throughput, latency, computational overhead,
network overhead, scalability and privacy. However, none of
them have been successful in addressing all the limitations to
an acceptable degree. We believe that in order to realize a
blockchain based IoT network on a large scale and with low
latency, there ought to be either a hybrid framework which
combines two or more of the already existing frameworks or an
existing framework that have a modified method of consensus.
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